中国农业机械化科学研究院集团有限公司 主管

北京卓众出版有限公司 主办

委托代理博弈与支农资金监管

Principal-agent Game and Supervision of Fiscal Fund for Assisting Agriculture

  • 摘要: 以委托代理博弈理论为依据,分析了我国支农资金运行监管中存在的问题,提出了增强信息透明度、减少委托代理环节、运用激励与惩罚相结合的机制,引导和规范代理人行为等对策建议。

     

    Abstract: Based on the principal-agent game theory,supervisory problems in operating fiscal fund for assisting agriculture were analyzed.Some advices including enhancing transparency of information,reducing principal-agent link,using incentive and punishment mechanism for combining,guiding and standardizing the agent behavior were put forward.

     

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