委托代理博弈与支农资金监管
Principal-agent Game and Supervision of Fiscal Fund for Assisting Agriculture
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摘要: 以委托代理博弈理论为依据，分析了我国支农资金运行监管中存在的问题，提出了增强信息透明度、减少委托代理环节、运用激励与惩罚相结合的机制，引导和规范代理人行为等对策建议。Abstract: Based on the principal-agent game theory，supervisory problems in operating fiscal fund for assisting agriculture were analyzed.Some advices including enhancing transparency of information，reducing principal-agent link，using incentive and punishment mechanism for combining，guiding and standardizing the agent behavior were put forward.
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